The Privatization of International Security by Leander, Anna
 
WORKING PAPER 
 
 
 
 
 
2009, nr. 10 
Monday, 30 November 2009 
 
 
 
 
The Privatization of International Security 
 
by Anna Leander  
Professor (mso) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Intercultural Communication and Management 
Porcelænshaven 18 A, DK-2000 Frederiksberg 
Copenhagen Business School 
  
Abstract 
The integration of private international security into Security Studies reflects the relatively recent 
nature of the market. The literature on the topic revolves around the basics of placing private 
international security on the agenda (1a); explaining and understanding the market (1b) and 
problematizing its relationship to central questions in international security (1c). The current trend 
in the field is to face the—still largely open—challenge of taking research further, both by 
completing, refining and updating current research efforts (2a) and by expanding and enriching the 
research agenda to more fully explore the politics of market development (2b). Paradoxically, as 
this entry concludes, this is leading scholars to abandon the focus on “privatization” and instead 
pushing them to formulate research agenda in new terms such as commercialization, 
commodification, governance or governmentality. 
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1. Introduction and Overview: PMSCs and International Security 
 
The privatization of international security could refer to a wide range of phenomena reflecting the 
growing role of non-state actors in international security. This Handbook’s entries on New Wars, 
Terrorism, State Failure, Migration, Organized Crime, or Energy Security could be read as reflections 
on “the privatization of international security”. This entry will not replicate their arguments or try to 
cover privatization in this broad sense. Rather, it will explore privatization in the more specific sense 
of the word, namely as referring to the incidence or process of transferring ownership, control or 
competencies from the public sector (state) to the private sector (business); in this case within the 
realm of International Security. It will in other words deal with the development of a market for force 
and with the private military and security companies (PMSCs) operating in it, looking at how these 
have become part of security studies. 
PMSCs are companies that buy and sell military and security services internationally. Their 
activities encompass logistics, intelligence, consultancies, training, and protection services. What ties 
them together is that they take on tasks that armed forces also can or do take on and that this directly 
ties them to the use of force. Since many contemporary conflicts are not international, this use of force 
might not be strictly speaking “military” but may fall within the “security” realm, hence the 
importance of talking about PMSCs rather than just PMCs. In fact, companies (particularly those 
providing protection such as Blackwater) insist on defining their activities as falling in the security 
realm to avoid association with mercenarism. As many other markets, the market for force is highly 
segmented; with companies specializing in different activities, catering for specific demands and 
(hence) having varied relations to clients and following different formal (laws, regulations) and 
informal (codes of conduct, norms) rules.1
Estimates (more akin to wild guesses) have conveyed the rapid and recent expansion and 
growth of the market. The private military sector reportedly doubled in size between 1990 and 1999 
($55 to $100 bn.) and is expected to double again by 2010 (reaching $200 bn.). The increased ratio of 
contractors to US soldiers. It said to have been 1-60 in the 1991 Gulf war and to have become 1,3-1 in 
Iraq 2007. At the same time a growing number of (heavily mediatized) incidences involving PMSCs 
have come to epitomize their presence in public discussions. Few will have remained unaware for 
example of the death of 17 Iraqi civilians shot by Blackwater employees in Baghdad in 2007, the 
“Trophy” video showing Aegis employees shooting at random while “driving in Iraq” in 2004, the 
involvement of TITAN and CACI employees in the abuse of Abu Ghraib inmates in 2003/4, the 
lynching of four Blackwater employees in Fallujah in 2004, or the role of Executive Outcomes in the 
Sierra Leonean civil war 1995-6. 
 
The integration of private international security into Security Studies reflects the relatively 
recent nature of the market. The literature on the topic revolves around the basics of placing private 
international security on the agenda (1a); explaining and understanding the market (1b) and 
problematizing its relationship to central questions in international security (1c). The current trend in 
the field is to face the—still largely open—challenge of taking research further, both by completing, 
refining and updating current research efforts (2a) and by expanding and enriching the research 
agenda to more fully explore the politics of market development (2b). Paradoxically, as this entry 
concludes, this is leading scholars to abandon the focus on “privatization” and instead pushing them 
to formulate research agenda in new terms such as commercialization, commodification, governance 
or governmentality. 
 
                                                     
1 This entry could be spent entirely on defining and describing the sector. But since this is not the aim see the 
relevant overview chapters in Avant 2005, Leander 2006, Singer 2003 or Isenberg 2007. 
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2. Key Themes 
Work on the privatization of security expresses the recent nature of the phenomenon. It evolves 
around the basic need of attracting attention to the significant developments that have taken place 
since the end of the cold war, to affirm its general political salience and of course also to show that it 
is a topic worthy scholarly attention. Much of this work is not strictly academic. Practionners have 
had strong reasons to push for more engagement with private international security. This section 
sketches out the key themes in the resulting literature.  
 
a. Discovering/Denouncing/Documenting Private International Security 
If this Handbook had been written 10 years ago, this entry would almost certainly not have been 
included. This is partly because the market expanded radically only after the end of the cold war. But 
it is also because conventional security studies and international relations refused (and in many camps 
still refuse) to acknowledge its significance, reducing firms to prolongations of states and denying the 
existence of markets. As a consequence a recurrent issue in the literature about private international 
security has been establishing its existence and relevance. 
 Non-academic work by journalists, think tanks, advocacy NGOs, security professionals 
(including members of armed forces and the private security sector) has played a key role in the 
documenting the significance of the market. Their closeness to the practice of security makes them 
acutely aware of changing role of markets and PMSCs. It also directly implicates them with the 
various problems and prospect inherent in market development. Business professionals and their 
professional associations have documented the part private security plays in a number of conflicts and 
suggested ways of using it more constructively (Spicer, Barlow, London, IPOA and BAPSC). 
Lawyers from the armed forces have documented the role of “contractors on the battle field” and 
pressed for clarifications of what can be demanded of them and what responsibility the armed forces 
have towards them (Guillory, Heaton, Zamparelli). Political activists have raised concerns about the 
issues of political and legal accountability when war becomes business (ICIJ, Musah and Fayemi). 
Public accountants have scrutinized the existing systems of economic accountability (GAO, Bauman 
and Rasor). Human rights activists and lawyers have debated the degree to which markets raise 
human rights concerns and how these might be dealt with (ICRC, War on Want, Human Rights First). 
Finally, journalists working in conflict areas and/or with international security have pushed for greater 
awareness around the role of market and market actors (Silverstein, Pelton Young) as well as studied 
specific firms (Scahill), specific subsectors (Shorrock) or the specific conflicts (Fainaru). 
The result is an extensive production on private international security driven by the concerns 
of those engaged in its practice. It is difficult to overstate the significance of this work for the 
development of the scholarly field. It has diffused information and details about a sector that can be 
difficult to access. It has done so in dialogue with the academic world providing “facts” and ideas 
about key issues and processes. Finally, the practionners engagement with private security has been 
key to public debate on the issue. Public awareness in turn has triggered a demand for scholarly work 
on the subject, ushered in funding for projects and legitimacy for research in the field. The 
consequence is that a degree rather uncommon in scholarly security studies—possibly reflecting more 
general transformations of knowledge production—work on private international security is “problem 
driven”; formulated in dialogue with practionners who discover, document and denounce the sector. 
 
b. Explaining and Understanding Private International Security 
The academic pendant of the need to discover, docmument and denounce is to explain and 
understand. As academia has become increasingly engaged with private international security, a 
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second focus therefore emerges: explaining and understanding private international security, including 
its origins, its workings and its government. 
 What made the development of private international security possible in the first place is an 
intriguing and interesting question. Why states would loosen up their control over the sensitive 
security sector and why professionals both in the formerly protected, heavily state subsidized 
military/security business and in the armed forces have welcomed and often encouraged its 
development are questions that figure prominently in the current academic literature on private 
international security. Arguments that recur in the answers include changing political conditions, and 
particularly the end of the cold, which drove states to diminish defense budgets and hence pushed 
security firms and professionals (unemployed professionals) to provide for themselves effectively 
creating a market (Cambridge Special Issue, Singer). More than this, region specific changes are often 
invoked in explanations. In Africa, for example, the end of apartheid left a large professional security 
force in search for alternative occupations. At the same time revisions in international development 
aid strategies and internal political alliance strategies made African states interested in market based 
security solutions (Abrahamsen special issue, Musah). Finally, changes in weapon technologies and 
the organization of armed forces; the revolution in military affairs and the associated use of “dual” 
and “off the shelf” technology as well as shifts in overarching governance patters—post-fordism and 
new public management—are suggested to have made less statist and more market oriented strategies 
seem inevitable also in the security sector (Kaldor et al., Markusen et al., Susman).  
 A second equally intriguing and difficult question that almost automatically follows from the 
previous one is how private international security works and particularly whether or not it is efficient. 
Is the market merely a shift in the way states do things and not really a private market at all with firms 
functioning as weapon systems in the hands of states (Shearer)? Or, are the firms genuinely private, 
working on in a private market with its own admittedly idiosyncratic norms and rules? Whether they 
are private or not, are these markets effective or—perhaps more adequately in view of the unraveling 
economic scandals—can they be made effective? What kind of institutions would it actually take to 
ensure that the markets proved capable of doing more than merely diverting the post-cold war peace 
dividend to those who were supposed to pay it (Cambridge special issue, Markusen, Singer)? These 
questions are not minor or narrowly economic ones. They are of intense political relevance since 
efficiency and cost savings have been pivotal in legitimizing outsourcing and privatization strategies 
everywhere. They also have ramifications into theoretical literature on organizational and governance 
structures in other areas and finally they very explicitly raise the question of how private international 
security is and should be governed. 
 To explain and understand the government of private international security is indeed a final 
central theme in existing scholarly work on private international security (Cateri, Chesterman). This 
should hardly come as a surprise since clarifying the relationship between markets and regulatory 
institutions is fundamental to understanding what firms can be held accountable for and where 
regulatory change is required—and politically feasible—to bring them under control (Coleman, 
Minow). This area is where academic and practionners interests overlap most directly and where line 
between the two is decidedly blurred. In the “mad scramble” (Kierpaul) to bring companies to justice 
a great number of publications in scholarly journals, in the form of commissioned reports and in form 
of advocacy papers have appeared to clarify, explain, and improve the possibilities of holding market 
actors accountable to civilians, their own employees, the states, armed forces, business, and 
institutions that contract them and inversely for ensuring that the companies have a possibility to 
demand accountability in return. These discussions have resulted not only in momentous progress in 
understanding of regulatory options, but also in growing clarity about where core disagreements and 
positions lie on how these can/should be used (de Wolf, Leander WP). Work explaining and 
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understanding private international security has contributed far more to the clarification of 
disagreements than to production of consensus knowledge.  
 
c. Debating the Consequences of Private International Security 
A final key theme in the study of private international security has been the substantive implications 
of privatization for international security. The development of a private international security market 
poses real questions about the way security is organized, distributed and understood.  
 The state monopoly on the legitimate use of force is arguably at the heart of the organization 
of international security. It certainly underpins conventional thinking about international security 
where states are the main actors and assumed to have such a monopoly. Altering (e.g. by making 
more legitimate) or bolstering (by e.g. tightening control) the state monopoly on legitimate force 
therefore also figure centrally in debates about how to deal with international security problems. How 
privatization affects this monopoly on the use of force—and hence the organization of —international 
security consequently figures centrally in the study of private international security. Is one of the 
fundamental institutions of international society undergoing far reaching change or not? Have we seen 
a revision of the long standing strong norm/weak law banning mercenarism in international relations 
(Milliard, Percy). The answers span the full spectrum of possibilities. Some scholars depict a world 
where private international security has fundamentally undermined the SMLF by creating a world of 
legitimate security activities beyond the state; a new-medievalism or coming anarchy where 
companies compete with states. However, most scholars prefer to discuss transformations (Avant, 
Krahmann, Verkuil) and many suggest that state authority might in fact be rather untouched by the 
development of private international security since the centrality of sovereignty is not affected by it 
(Thomson). Private international security might solidify the conventional organization of international 
security by rendering sovereignty and the SMLF even more central to international security relations. 
The market sharpens the divide between states who can bolster private international security to their 
own advantage and those that cannot not (Leander). 
 This evokes questions about what the development of private international security entails for 
the distribution of international security. Cui bono? The classical question has been a key bone of 
contention also in the discussions surrounding private international security. This question can of 
course be posed at the level of hierarchies among states as just indicated. Whose states security 
interests are served by the development of private international security and whose are not? For some 
private international security is above all the enabling condition of aggressive US/ Western uni-
laterialism (Tiefer) or of a form of corporate neo-imperialism allowing companies to govern economic 
activities and the territory necessary to that end (Francis, Musah). Either way, private international 
security exacerbates inequalities among states in the international system. For others, private 
international security is the condition which makes it possible for (some) weak and crumbling states 
to upgrade their armed forces and defend themselves against the spillovers from regional conflicts 
(Brooks, Howe). In this account, private international security bolsters weak states and hence 
diminishes inequality in the hierarchy among states. 
Moving beyond the question of hierarchies among states to the level of whose security needs 
are served by the development of private international security, we again find sharply contrasting 
positions. Some scholars see private international security as the only alternative individuals, 
companies, NGOs and public institutions can avail themselves of when they operate in areas where 
public security has broken down (Abrahmsen, Cillers). They hence point out that this might 
compensate the obvious moral dilemma of embracing a system where only those in possession of the 
necessary financial means can ask for protection. Other scholars suggest that although this might be 
true at the individual level, it has the overall broader effect of further militarizing and securitizing 
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social relations by increasing the presence, use and centrality of armed security. It hence leads to a 
deterioration of public security; not to its restoration (Cockayne, Leander, Spearin).  
 This leads straight to a final central theme in the study of private international security; its 
significance for security understandings, for the “construction” of threats and formulations of security 
strategies and politics. Does it matter that security is partly provided through markets for how threats 
are understood? The (often implicit) answer to this question particularly by those who advocate 
privatization but also by many other contributors to the discussions surrounding private international 
security is that companies respond to a given demand. They are “agents” of “principals”; when the 
military is involved the principal is usually a state while security services may be sold also to 
business, journalists and NGOs. The companies offer services to respond to predefined needs and 
threats; viz. a state contracting in private air-transport to transport soldiers or an NGO needing convoy 
protection in Afghanistan. The market does not define the threats. However, from a critical vantage 
point, it has been suggested that the companies actually re-shape security understandings as a part of 
their perfectly normal and legal activities for example through their consultancies, trainings, 
advertisements, routine practices, participation in public discussions: through the very basic fact that 
they promote security products they heighten awareness of insecurity and hence alter security 
perceptions (Der Derian, Leander, Lund-Petersen). This raises the more general question about 
whether or not there is a need to think about private security as a “contested commodity” on par with 
the trade in organs or prostitution where the strong moral and ethical stakes would warrant serious 
thinking about regulations on lobbying, public engagement, marketing and information about the 
sector (Sapone).  
3. Trends and Challenges ahead 
Just as the key themes in the study of private international security bear the mark of the recent nature 
of the field, so do the current research trends and challenges ahead. The basic needs of discovering, 
explaining and understanding basic aspects of private international security continue to play an 
important role and will do so for the foreseeable future. In addition to this, as the study of private 
international security is becoming more established the trend and challenge ahead is to refine and 
enrich the questions asked about it. Paradoxically (perhaps) this seems to be leading scholars away 
from the study of privatization.  
 
a. Filling the gaps 
Publications about private international security are mushrooming in all academic fields including in 
security studies. However, and in spite of this, there are major gaps in the basic knowledge and 
understanding of it. One trend at present is to close these gaps by looking at both at the many still 
under researched aspects of private international security and by integrating the constant evolution 
into the study area. 
 Writing about private international security has been rather narrow in its focus. It has been 
built largely around two empirical areas of study. The first is the role of private international security 
in the developing world. The reason is the central and much debated role of large private companies 
in key conflicts including for example the role of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone and Angola, of 
Sandline in Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea (neither company exists today), of DynCorp in 
Colombia and of MPRI in Bosnia. The second is the role of large contractors to the US Armed Forces 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. This means that large swaths of private international security remain 
understudied. This is true of private international security outside the areas mentioned, including 
geographically notably private international security in Europe (Krahmann) but also in the developing 
world beyond the 1990s (Abrahamsen special issue). More than this, the focus on the large firms has 
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meant that the role of smaller firms or firms working outside the highly mediatized conflicts has been 
largely left off the radar screens. The implication is that the vast subcontracting sector, the global 
employment practices and the ramifications of the global market remain ill understood. One of the 
current trends is therefore to expand the understanding of private international security in this 
direction (e.g. Abrahamsen and Williams).  
Second, private international security is no fixed entity. On the contrary, the sizeable public 
debate and reflexivity about it makes it a dynamic and evolving area with constantly shifting and 
contested boundaries. The regulation and international standards governing private international 
security is developing rapidly as illustrated by changes in national and international regulation 
including the 2007 expansion of the US Uniform Code of Military Justice, the adoption of the ICRC 
Montreux Document, the changes occurring in the UN working group on mercenaries or shifting fates 
of the codes of conducted published e.g. by DCAF, IPOA and BASCP. More than this, governance is 
changing forms, particularly because of the steady growth of private sector involvement. Private 
security actors are to a growing extent taking part in various forms of private-public-partnerships and 
hybrid institutions governing private international security but also to a growing degree other realms 
including for example training policies or standard setting efforts (Dorn and Levi). Finally, the 
overarching logic for governing conducts (governmentality) in the security field, as in other areas, is 
increasingly “neo-l,iberal” (in the Foucauldian understanding); a trend that is both shaped by and 
shaping the privatization of security. Analyzing the meaning, implications and causes of these 
changes is a trend in writing (e.g. Leander, Salter). 
Finally, scholars are enlargeing the kinds of questions asked of private international security. 
Projects are emerging on a wide range of central issues that have remained explored. One example is 
the relation of private international security to gender inside the market, among security professionals, 
but in society more broadly including both the home context of the companies and the places they 
operate (Schultz). This is but one example intended to underscore the trend to fill the gaps not only in 
knowledge but to open the field of private international security toward the study of a range of 
interesting issues 
 
b. Acknowledging the limitations of private international security 
The perhaps most interesting trend—and future challenge— is the critical evaluation of the limits 
inherent in a research agenda formulated around private international security.  
 One of the many established truths about private international security has been that the 
boundaries between states and markets are “blurred” and that the revolving doors at all levels are 
many. The spheres are for all purposes partly enmeshed. The practical implication has been that 
privatization understood as shifting ownerships, control and authority is difficult to establish. But 
perhaps even more significantly, the extent of overlap or enmeshment means that substantial political 
changes may take place without necessarily involving shifts in the formal private-public divide. Shifts 
for example in public discourses shaped by private international security advertising and lobbying, 
shifts in routine intelligence practices, or shifts in the hierarchies among security professionals linked 
to the growth of private international security may be of substantial political salience but entail no 
shifts in public-private authority. A discourse focusing on that divide may hence not only miss key 
political developments but also obscure them. The focus on the public-private divide distracts 
attention from critical inquiry and (thereby) bolsters the impression that private international security 
may have developed without significant political implications. 
Scholars working on private international security have increasingly become (more or less 
articulately) aware of these drawbacks linked to a research agenda framed in terms of privatization. 
The consequence has been a trend to steer away from privatization and instead formulate research in 
terms that do not direct attention to the public or private status of actors but rather to the effects of 
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creating security markets. Commodification, commercialization, governance and governmentality 
have come to figure more centrally on the research agenda. This move links studies of private 
international security more tightly to the broader “new” or “critical” security agenda. Questions 
surrounding the commercial production of new insecurities, the commercial refashioning of security 
spaces and the commercial everyday security practices figure prominently on this new research 
agenda (as elaborated in Leander 2009). The irony is that in their effort of gain leverage on the 
politics of private international security, researchers have had to confront the inherent limitations of 
an agenda focused on privatization: they have moved from studying the privatization of international 
security to the study of commercial insecurity. The reference list below is designed to give anyone 
interested in this field rapidly evolving field and its change plenty entry points for judging whether or 
not they agree with this depiction of the field and the many other claims advanced above. 
 
4.  References and Links 
Useful weblinks: 
The British Association of Private Security Companies (UK Based industry organization) 
http://www.bapsc.org.uk/  
The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces programme on the Privatization of 
Security: http://www.privatesecurityregulation.net/introduction  
The Institute for Security Studies (Pretoria ZA) privatization project  
http://www.issafrica.org/index.php?link_id=30&link_type=12&tmpl_id=2  
The International Consortium of Investigative Journalists project on the business of war 
http://projects.publicintegrity.org/bow/  
The International Peace institute database over researchers on international private security 
http://www.ipinst.org/our-work/coping-with-crisis/grips/  
The International Peace Operations Association (US based industry organization) 
http://ipoaworld.org/eng/ 
 Private Military Org. Provides useful company links and links to literature 
http://www.privatemilitary.org  
All major firms run their own very instructive websites. 
 
Reports/Official Documents 
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http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/mercenaries/wgstandards.htm  
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